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The COVID-19 pandemic has made the European Commission revaluate its role in member states health
systems. In response, the European Union is planning to significantly increase investment to tackle cross-
border health threats. The European Centre for Communicable Disease Prevention and Control is well
positioned to capitalise upon this increased investment by designing and implementing a renewed
European strategy for infection disease control. To secure meaningful and sustainable improvements, the
European Centre for Communicable Disease Prevention and Control needs to be strengthened with more
resources, an expanded geographical scope and legislative change.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
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The European Union (EU) has recently announced it will
allocate over 9 billion EUR of funding to the EU4Health programme
between 2021 and 2027 to focus on three primary aims: tackling
cross-border health threats, making medicines available and
affordable, and strengthening health systems (European Commis-
sion, 2020a). This is a twenty-fold increase in health spending from
the 450 million EUR the EU spent on health priorities in the
previous seven years (European Commission, 2020b), and repre-
sents a fundamental shift in the approach of the EU to member
states’ health systems. Historically the EU has been wary to ensure
it does not overstep its involvement in how member states operate
their health systems as pre-existing treaties such as the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) state the EU must
respect member states’ autonomy in operating their own health
systems (Mossialos et al., 2010). This is one explanation for what
has been considered as a slow and uncoordinated response to the
pandemic by the EU (Dimitrakopoulos and Lalis, 2020; Anderson
et al., 2020). The EU is keen not to repeat past mistakes. In contrast
to historical precedent, the EU now argues it has a crucial role in
strengthening health systems to improve the EU’s preparedness for
future health threats (European Commission, 2020a).
But how could the EU achieve its goal of improving health
system preparedness? The EU4Health programme includes severalson).
er Ltd on behalf of International So
d/4.0/).priorities such as stockpiling medical supplies including personal
protective equipment, creating a reserve of healthcare staff and
experts that can be mobilised in a crisis, and increasing
surveillance of health threats (European Commission, 2020a).
Yet there remains lack of clarity. There is a need for an organisation
to take responsibility for these actions. The European Centre for
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), established in 2004, which
already provides scientific advice on preparedness to all EU
countries as well as Iceland and Norway would be the obvious
choice (Gallina and Ricci, 2020). The ECDC has already built
relationships with public health agencies and health ministries
across Europe. It has also established initiatives such as the Early
Warning and Response System (EWRS), an online portal that
connects public health agencies across Europe to facilitate the
sharing of surveillance data in as close to real time as is possible
(ECDC, 2020). However, the ECDC is restrained in its ability to take
on a larger role in health system strengthening due to several
barriers.
Investment
First, the ECDC is understaffed and under resourced, with under
300 staff and an annual budget of only around 60 million EUR to
cover a population of over 500 million people (ECDC, 2019). In
contrast, the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States
has an annual budget of over 2.5 billion USD for infectious diseases
to cover a population of around 330 million people (Centre for
Disease Control, 2020). However this disparity needs to be
understood in the context of the ECDC having a more restrictedciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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health agencies that often have considerable resources at their
disposable. For example the Robert Koch Institute in Germany has
an annual budget of around 100 million EUR (International Labour
Organization, 2017), and Santé Publique France has an annual
budget of around 200 million EUR (Santé publique, 2020). As a
result, the role of the ECDC has typically been restricted to offering
scientific advice, coordinating surveillance efforts with national
public health agencies and performing external quality assess-
ments of laboratories. The EU4Health programme offers a valuable
opportunity to increase investment in the ECDC. This could see the
ECDC transition into a wider role where it could co-invest with
countries in infrastructure needed to improve surveillance. Urgent
priorities include improved access to diagnostics, better use of
health information technology, and enhanced laboratory capacity.
The role of the ECDC should remain primarily as a coordinator of
infectious disease control activities in Europe, and the primary
objective of co-investment initiatives should be to support
countries who may need additional financial and technical
support. However, there are areas of policy which could benefit
from increased centralisation, for example the ECDC could expand
its role in workforce planning by the coordination and subsi-
disation, in resource constrained countries, of educational
programmes to deliver a sustainable supply of infection prevention
and control nurses, specialist infectious disease physicians, and
infectious disease epidemiologists. This is important to consider on
a European level as there is significant mobility of the healthcare
workforce between European countries.
Geographical Scope
Second, the ECDC is limited in its geographical scope as its
mandate does not allow it to routinely conduct surveillance or offer
advice to many countries considered part of Europe which are not
part of the EU or the European Economic Area (EEA). Countries not
within the remit of the ECDC include Switzerland, Ukraine, Belarus,
and many countries in the Balkans such as Serbia, Albania, and
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The UK may soon join this list with its
impending exit from the EU, as there is currently no clarity on its
future relationship with the ECDC (Anderson et al., 2020). As many
of these countries have multiple borders with European countries
under the remit of the ECDC, this is a major barrier to establishing a
comprehensive and effective European response to infectious
disease outbreaks. The geographic scope of the ECDC also creates
barriers to working effectively with the World Health Organisation
(WHO) at the European level. The WHO Regional Office for Europe,
which also conducts surveillance of infectious diseases, encom-
passes a total of 53 countries (World Health Organisation Regional
Office for Europe, 2020), whereas the remit of the ECDC current
extends to only 29 countries (European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control, 2020). If the geographical scope of these
organisations were to align, this would create further opportu-
nities to collaborate and avoid duplication in efforts. A bolder
proposition to consider would be for the WHO and the EU to pool
their resources to make the ECDC the sole organisation responsible
for infectious disease surveillance at the European level. There is a
precedent for the EU involving other countries in their initiatives.
The EU Civil Protection Mechanism, established in 2001, involves
all EU member states but also Iceland, North Macedonia,
Montenegro, Norway, Serbia and Turkey (European Commission,
2020c). The mechanism is supported by the Emergency Response
Coordination Centre (ERCC) which operates 24/7 and coordinates
assistance to countries in desperate need (European Commission,
2020d). There is potential for the ECDC to collaborate with the
ERCC to response to emerging pandemics in the future.Legislative Barriers
Third, if the ECDC is to expand its role in health system
preparedness and surveillance then there are legislative barriers
which need to be overcome. First, legislation may be needed to
facilitate data sharing. Current regulation such as the general data
protection regulation (GDPR) can limit the sharing of patient
information. If countries outside the EU are to participate in the
activities of the ECDC they may need to strengthen their data
protection legislation. If achieved the EU may consider granting
certain countries with adequacy decisions, which can facilitate
international data flows (European Commission, 2020e). Second,
legislation may be need to improve compliance with data
reporting. A recent independent evaluation of the ECDC also
concluded that gaps and variation in member states reporting of
data continued to hinder European surveillance efforts (PWC,
2019). The voluntary nature of current surveillance initiatives
leaves the ECDC with few levers to penalise member states which
repeatedly fail to meet reporting standards (Renda and Castro,
2020). Third, current EU treaties may need to be amended. The EU
decision on serious cross border threats to health attempted to
promote solidarity and provide a legislative framework for
collective EU action during major health crises. However, this
decision did not stop countries banning exports and stockpiling
medications, PPE, and ventilators during the COVID-19 pandemic
(Anderson et al., 2020). Under their current mandate the EU has
also hesitated to issue recommendations on certain issues relevant
to health systems during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the
EU only published guidance on the use of diagnostic tests in mid-
April (European Commission, 2020f). A potential amendment to
the TFEU could include provisions that temporarily enhance the
role of the EU during pandemic circumstances. However, this could
prove difficult to enforce as many countries may still choose to
prioritise their own interests.
Conclusion
In summary, the EU4Health programme represents a funda-
mental shift in the approach of the EU to health systems. The
COVID-19 pandemic has also led to increased commitment at the
European level to strengthen infectious disease preparedness,
surveillance, and response. Combined, this represents a once in a
generation opportunity to develop a comprehensive strategy to
infectious diseases across Europe. The ECDC is well positioned to
deliver this strategy but to do so it must be funded appropriately.
Its scope would need to be extended to incorporate all countries
across Europe and legislative barriers would need to be addressed
to allow improved sharing of information and to provide the
mandate to invest in health systems. European health policy
should be forward-looking, rather than reactive to health
emergencies and pandemics. The EU should not stand still.
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